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Key points:
1. We present calibrated projections of sea-level rise that represent uncertainties in
global temperature changes, oceanic heat uptake, and sea-level rise contributions
from thermal expansion, and mass loss from the Antarctic ice sheet, the
Greenland ice sheet and small glaciers and ice caps.
2. These probabilistic sea-level projections explicitly approximate the deeply
uncertain contribution of the West Antarctic ice sheet. The projections aim to
inform robust decisions, i.e., that are less sensitive to non-trivial or controversial
assumptions.
3. We show how the deep uncertainties surrounding the WAIS contributions can
dominate the uncertainties within decades from now.
Abstract
Future sea-level rise poses nontrivial risks for many coastal communities [1, 2].
Managing these risks often relies on consensus projections like those provided by the
IPCC [3]. Yet, there is a growing awareness that the surrounding uncertainties may be
much larger than typically perceived [4]. Recently published sea-level projections appear
widely divergent and highly sensitive to non-trivial model choices [4] and the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) may be much less stable than previously believed, enabling
a rapid disintegration [5, 6]. In response, some agencies have already announced to
update their projections accordingly [7, 8]. Here, we present a set of probabilistic
sea-level projections that approximate deeply uncertain WAIS contributions. The
projections aim to inform robust decisions by clarifying the sensitivity to non-trivial or
controversial assumptions. We show that the deeply uncertain WAIS contribution can
dominate other uncertainties within decades. These deep uncertainties call for the
development of robust adaptive strategies [9].These decision-making needs, in turn,
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require mission-oriented basic science, for example about potential signposts and the
maximum rate of WAIS induced sea-level changes.
The construction of sea-level projections is often largely motivated by scientific
considerations, i.e. in order to better understand the underlying physics [2, 10]. In this
process, the translation from input data to model projections and full uncertainty
estimates involves a wide range of non-trivial model choices and assumptions than can
result in large discrepancies between different uncertainty estimates [4]. For example,
many studies consider a high level of model detail indispensable for reliable
projections [3] whereas semi-empirical model approaches [11–13] trade complexity for
the ability to calibrate the model. Semi-empirical modeling approaches often rely on
strong assumptions about the prior parameter distributions, what mechanisms to
include, and how to interpret and represent the data-model discrepancies. Those
modeling choices can be nontrivial and the associated uncertainties hard to
quantify [14]. One the other hand, projections based on multi-model ensembles
(implicitly) focus on structural uncertainty which requires strong assumptions on which
part of the overall uncertainty is covered [4].
Decision makers often prefer ”robust” over optimal decisions when faced with ”deep”
uncertainty [15–18]. Deep uncertainty refers to a situation when experts cannot agree
upon or are not willing to provide probabilistic uncertainty ranges [16]. In the context
of decision making, robustness has many different definitions that usually involve
trading some optimality for relative insensitivity to deviations from the model
assumptions or relative good performance over a wide range of futures (e.g. [16–19]).
Here we present sea-level projections that are intended to support the design of
robust strategies to cope with the deep uncertainties surrounding sea-level change, i.e.
“solutions capable of withstanding from deviations of the conditions for which they are
designed” [18]. This notion of “robustness” deviates from scientific robustness that
builds on arguably well understood physics and empirical/robust evidence [20–22],
which may lead to overconfident uncertainty ranges [2, 4] and getting surprised by new
insights and data [10].
Our sea-level projections are constructed to support robust decision frameworks by i)
being explicit about the relevant uncertainties, both shallow and deep; ii)
communicating plausible ranges of sea-level rise, including the deep uncertainties
surrounding future climate forcings and potential WAIS collapse; and iii) erring on the
side of underconfident versus overconfident when possible.
Model design
We design the projections to be probabilistic where reasonable and explicit about
deep uncertainties (e.g. resulting from non-trivial model choices) when needed. Robust
decision frameworks often apply plausible rather than probabilistic ranges to represent
and communicate uncertainties (e.g. [18, 23]). In the case of sea-level projections, the
bounding of the plausible range usually involves both a probabilistic interpretation of
the surrounding uncertainties and estimates of which probabilities are still relevant. For
example, a full disintegration of the major ice-sheets is often not taken into account
because the probabilities of this occurring are considered too small to be relevant [3, 24].
What probability is relevant is highly dependent on the decision context and therefore it
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makes sense to be explicit about the probabilities. Moreover, probabilities are the
easiest and most unambiguous way to communicate uncertainties (e.g. [25, 26]).
Our projections are designed to highlight the relatively large deep uncertainties,
notably those resulting from future climate forcings and those surrounding potential
WAIS collapse (even though representations of deep uncertainty often implicitly
encompass probabilistic interpretations). The future climate forcing is, to a large extent,
controlled by future human decisions.
The probability of a WAIS collapse is potentially much larger than previously thought
due to the combined effects of Marine Ice Sheet Instability (MISI), ice cliff failure and
hydrofracturing [5, 6]. The discovery of this new mechanism puts earlier expert
elicitations in a different light as it is unclear if those were based on this combined
effect. One approach when faced with deeply uncertain model structures and priors is
to present a potential WAIS collapse as deeply uncertain by means of a plausible range.
We stress that this range is not meant to represent an implicit probabilistic projection
of the WAIS contribution to sea-level rise.
We merge some small deep uncertainties into the probabilistic part of the projections.
According to Herman et al. [18] ”... a larger risk lies in sampling too narrow a range
(thus ignoring potentially important vulnerabilities) rather than too wide a range which,
at worst, will sample extreme states of the world in which all alternatives fail”. Thus, in
the context of informing robust decision making, it can be preferable to be slightly
under- than slightly overconfident. To minimize the risk of producing overconfident
projections we only use observational data with relatively uncontroversial and
well-defined error structure.
Model setup
We use a relatively simple (39 free physical and statistical parameters), but a
mechanistically motivated model framework to link transient sea-level rise to radiative
concentration pathways applying sub-models for the global climate, Thermal Expansion
(TE), and contributions of the Antarctic Ice Sheet (AIS), Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS)
and Glaciers and Small Ice Caps (GSIC) (see Methods). This approach extends on the
semi-empirical model setup recently reported by Mengel et al. [13].
We use a Bayesian calibration method, wherein paleo-climatic data is assimilated
with the AIS model separately from the calibration for the rest of the model, which
assimilates only modern observations. Modern model simulations are then run at
parameters drawn from the two resulting calibrated parameter sets (AIS and
rest-of-model) and compared to global mean sea-level (GMSL) data [27] (see Methods).
Only model realizations which agree with each GMSL data point to within 4σ are
admitted into the final ensemble for analysis. 4σ was chosen so the spread in the model
ensemble characterizes well the uncertainty in the GMSL data (Figure 1f).
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Figure 1. Past observations (purple) and hindcasts (blue) global temperature, ocean heat content,
sea-level contribution and global sea-level. Shadings represent the uncertainty (2σ) in the observational data
and the 5-95% range in calibrated hindcasts.
We choose, at this time, not to use paleo-reconstructions nor reanalyses, beyond
incorporating a windowing approach into our calibration method for the Antarctic ice
sheet parameters. This choice is motivated by the highly complex and uncertain error
structure of these data sets. Failure to account for such complex error structure can
result in considerable overconfidence, especially for low-probability events [28].
Observational data and hindcasts
Global temperature, ocean heat, and most sea-level contributions have typically been
subject to upward, slightly accelerating trends since 1850 (Figure 1) [3]. Only the
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sea-level contribution from AIS has been close to zero and might even have been slightly
negative [3]. The reliability of the datasets decreases back in time due to the lower data
availability and only the datasets for global mean surface temperature and global mean
sea level go back to before 1950.
For the oceanic thermal expansion we use trends (together with the uncertainty
estimates) as reported by the IPCC [3] for the calibration (Table S1). The time scale
and uncertainties of the paleo-climatic AIS data are substantially different from the
those of the observational data for other components of sea-level rise. For this reason,
we calibrate the AIS model separately from the others, based on paleo-data as
previously used by Shaffer [29] and Ruckert et al. [30] (see Methods).
In general, the calibrated hindcasts (including both statistical and parameter
uncertainty) correspond reasonably well to the reported uncertainty ranges surrounding
the observational data. After calibration and post-calibration our hindcasts of especially
global temperature and global sea-level match the observations fairly well whereas the
component models show some small deviations; GSIC uncertainty is slightly too large
and the high AIS contribution during the Last Interglacial period is somewhat
underestimated.
Projections
The probabilistic part of the projections yields 90% credible ranges of 0.40-0.71 m
(RCP2.6), 0.54-0.97 m (RCP4.5), and 0.85-1.59 m (RCP8.5) sea-level in 2100, relative to
1986-2005 mean sea level (Figure 2). This is slightly higher than projected by the recent
and comparable study of Mengel et al. [13] 13 (that projects 0.28-0.56 m, 0.37-0.77 m,
and 0.57-1.31 m for RCP2.6, RCP4.5, and RCP8.5, respectively) and can be explained
by the relatively large contributions from the large ice bodies (Figure 3 and Table S2).
Our projected uncertainties in global sea-level are however quite similar to the results of
Mengel et al. [13].
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Figure 2. Future probabilistic global sea-level projections for the 21st cen-
tury under RCP2.6 (blue), RCP4.5 (pink) and RCP8.5 (purple) forcing sce-
narios [31], compared to the projections for 2100 by Mengel et al. [13] (ver-
tical side bars)
This similarity seems somewhat surprising since we deliberately aimed to be
conservative with our prior parameter choices, but can be explained by our two-step
calibration approach (see Methods). In the first step we calibrate the individual
components of sea-level rise separately (similarly to Mengel et al. [13]), which indeed
gives much wider uncertainty ranges in the projected sea-level rise and its components
(not shown). Yet, those separate ranges are considerably reduced by the second
combined calibration step based that also assimilates global sea-level data.
Deep uncertainties
Pollard et al. [5] suggests that a WAIS collapse might be possible on the order of
decades. Yet, the timing of a rapid disintegration is deeply uncertain. DeConto and
Pollard [6] present four widely divergent uncertainty ranges with, depending on the
model choices, central estimates ranging from 64 to 114 cm for the sea-level contribution
at 2100 following RCP8.5.
Our study contributes to communicating this deep uncertainty by characterizing the
effect on plausible changes in global sea-level rise given the additional processes such as
oceanic thermal expansion. We provide three projections based on three WAIS-collapse
scenarios, following RCP8.5; no collapse (0cm), a mid-range estimate (79cm, based on
DeConto and Pollard [6], see methods), and a high case (3.3m, full WAIS disintegration
within a couple decades [5] (Figure 4). For 2100, this implies a factor two to four wider
uncertainty range that should be accounted for to design robust strategies to cope with
the deeply uncertain sea-level response to anthropogenic climate change. It is important
to note that we do not intend to assign an implicit probability distribution to these
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Figure 3. Future probabilistic projections of global temperature, ocean heat content and
sea-level contributions.
deeply uncertain projections. We simply want to characterize and communicate key
aspects of the deeply uncertain WAIS contribution to sea-level rise.
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Figure 4. Future sea-level projections including deeply uncertain contribu-
tion AIS response.
Conclusions and discussion
We presented a set of sea-level projections designed to represent important deep
uncertainties and to inform robust decision-making frameworks. Our simple model
framework includes semi-empirical models of the climate and sea-level contributions
from thermal expansion, the Antarctic ice sheet, the Greenland ice sheet, and glaciers
and small ice caps. Its relative simplicity is chosen to result in a transparent model
structure and to enable a date-model fusion. Our calibration is designed to avoid
overconstraining the projections. We hence only utilize observational data accompanied
with clear uncertainty estimates, and aim for relatively non-informative prior
distributions. We communicate divergent expert assessments and large structural
uncertainties as deep uncertainties surrounding the projections.
The deeply uncertain contribution of WAIS disintegration dominates the overall
uncertainty surrounding the sea-level projections. We present examples of low and high
sea-level rise scenarios that could be expanded by relying more heavily on expert
elicitation [32,33] or by incorporating strong priors on the characterization of the West
Antarctic deep uncertainties.
8/13
Methods
0.1 Semi-empirical model framework
We combine previously published, semi-empirical models (Table S1). The global
temperature and ocean heat content are simulated with the coupled zero dimensional
climate and 1D ocean model DOECLIM [34]. The global mean surface temperature
anomaly (Tg) feeds into the four models of sea-level contribution from thermal
expansion (e.g. [13]), glaciers and small ice caps (submodel of MAGICC) [35], the
Greenland ice sheet (SIMPLE) [36], and the Antarctic ice sheet (DAIS) [29].
The DAIS model also requires Antarctic ocean surface temperatures (TANTO) which
we estimate from a simple linear relation with Tg bounded below at the freezing point of
salt water (Tf = -1.4°C),
TANTO = Tf +
aANTO×Tg+bANTO−Tf
1+exp[(aANTO×Tg+bANTO−Tf ) aANTO]
where aANTO is the sensitivity of the Antarctic ocean temperature to global mean
surface temperature (unitless), and bANTO is the Antarctic ocean temperature for
Tg=0°C. aANTO and bANTO are both estimated as uncertain model parameters.
For the models with four or fewer physical parameters (TE-model, MAGICC-GSIC,
SIMPLE, and ANTO) we calibrate all parameters. For DOECLIM we apply the same
free (physical) parameters as Urban et al. [37] (climate sensitivity (S ), the aerosol
amplification factor (α), and the ocean vertical diffusivity (κ)), and for DAIS the same
as used by Shaffer [29] and Ruckert et al. [30].
0.2 Model calibration
The model calibration approach consists of two stages. In the first stage, the AIS
model is calibrated using paleo-climatic data as in Ruckert et al [30], along with trends
in the AIS mass balance from the IPCC AR5 [3]. The rest of the model components are
similarly calibrated using modern observations. The reason for the separate calibrations
is the vastly different temporal scale and characterization of errors between the
paleo-climatic versus the modern data. All of the calibration data are detailed in Table
S1. The model calibration is done using a robust adaptive Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) approach [38]. For both the paleo-climatic and the modern calibrations,
Gelman and Rubin diagnostics are examined to assess convergence [39].
All parameters are assigned wide, physically-motivated prior ranges (Table S3),
intentionally taken at least as wide as ranges considered in previous studies [30,37] or
divergent estimates from the literature (Table S4). We rely on published ranges, if these
ranges are derived from data other than we use for the full calibration. For example,
climate sensitivity is one of the parameters of our climate model, but published
uncertainty ranges rely often on the same past observational data. Using those
uncertainty ranges as prior would double-count the information content in the data. If
independent priors are not available, we formulate priors that are constrained by our
mechanistic understanding, and pre-calibration [40]. This approach is one potential
source of deep uncertainty, especially in case of limited availability of data to update the
prior distribution. We are not aware of uncontroversial prior distributions for a
potential rapid ice-sheet contribution of the West-Antarctic ice-sheet and we therefore
restrict ourselves to a deeply uncertain range.
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In the paleo-climatic calibration, four parallel MCMC chains of 500,000 DAIS model
realizations each are sampled. The first 120,000 iterations of each is removed for
burn-in, yielding 1,520,000 posterior parameter estimates for analysis. For the modern
calibration, four parallel MCMC chains of 1,000,000 iterations each of the coupled
DOECLIM-thermal expansion-GSIC-GIS model (modern calibration) are simulated.
The last 500,000 iterations from each chain are used for analysis as the calibrated
”rest-of-model” parameter estimates, yielding 2,000,000 posterior parameter samples for
analysis.
50,000 sample parameter sets are drawn from the DAIS and rest-of-model calibrated
parameter sets. The entire parameter combination at which the models were run is
preserved in this sampling. What is lacking at this stage is the joint rest-of-model and
DAIS parameter distribution. The post-calibration step estimates this link by running
the entire BRICK sea-level rise module (DOECLIM-ANTO-thermal
expansion-GSIC-GIS-AIS) at these sampled parameter values. The parameter
combinations are restricted to only those which yielded model realizations for global
mean sea-level (GMSL) which matched data [27] to within a four-sigma window around
all GMSL data points. The four-sigma range was chosen so as not to overconstrain, but
still restrict the ensemble to simulations with a realistic representation of GMSL. Out of
the 50,000 posterior samples, 5,612 post-calibrated model simulations are found. These
served as the parameter samples for projections of GMSL. Projections to 2100 of GMSL
and its components (thermal expansion, GSIC, GIS, and AIS) are made using
Representative Concentration Pathways 2.6, 4.5, and 8.5 [31]. Experiments conducted
using alternative windowing approaches for the GMSL post-calibration show little (at
most five centimeters) variation in the 5-95% ranges of projected sea-level rise in 2100.
Online Content Methods, along with any additional Extended Data display items
and Source Data, are available in the online version of the paper; references unique to
these sections appear only in the online paper.
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